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Rebecca M. Blank
Starting in the mid-1970s, most western industrialized countries experienced
a sharp decrease in growth and a corresponding rise in unemployment. In Eu-
rope these problems continued throughout the 1980s. In fact, growth in most
European countries was slower from 1980 through 1990 than it had been from
1973 to 1979. Unemployment—particularly long-term unemployment—con-
tinued to rise in the 1980s to unprecedented rates. While the United States
experienced similar trends between 1973 and 1983, over the late 1980s the
United States saw a substantial decline in unemployment and an acceleration
in growth. This generated a sustained discussion about what the United States
was doing right that European countries were doing wrong. One answer to
that question came to be widely accepted: the idea that the European growth
difficulties were at least partially caused by their more extensive welfare states.
The level of social protection provided through labor market regulation and
income support programs limited the market response to high unemployment,
it was argued, preventing workers from shifting rapidly from slower- to faster-
growing segments of the economy. In other words, a trade-off was posited
between social protection and economic flexibility. The United States, with
lower levels of income or employment protection for workers, had an economy
that adjusted more rapidly to the perilous economic environment of the past
two decades.
This volume explores in more detail the relationship between social protec-
tion programs and labor market flexibility. As Rebecca Blank and Richard
Freeman note in the first chapter, there is actually very little direct empirical
evidence that measures the impact of social programs on the speed of labor
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market adjustment to a changing economic environment. The papers in this
volume are designed to fill that gap, looking at cross-national comparisons over
time between countries that demonstrate particularly interesting differences in
the structure of their social protection systems and analyzing the effects of
these differences on labor market adjustment.
What Can Cross-National Comparisons Contribute?
The divergent European and U.S. economic experiences of the 1980s have
increased interest in cross-national research. This volume uses differences be-
tween countries, both across programs and over time, to study the impact of
different tax, transfer, and regulatory programs on the degree of short-term
price, wage, and mobility adjustment within labor markets. Cross-national
comparisons are not perfect "natural experiments," however. Many significant
differences in behavior among different countries, such as the greater work
hours of Americans compared to Europeans, have developed over time and
probably reflect responses to long-term differences in institutional structures
and economic incentives. These national differences can create problems in
making proper cross-national inferences, but this is no different than the prob-
lem that economists long have faced in drawing inferences by comparing dif-
ferent individuals within a country. It is the essential problem of all nonexperi-
mental research: potential unmeasured heterogeneity or omitted variables may
lead the analyst to draw mistaken causal conclusions.
There are several ways to deal with this problem in cross-national research.
One way is to limit comparisons to countries with relatively similar economic,
institutional, and demographic patterns. Thus, comparisons between the Swed-
ish and the U.S. income transfer systems may have fewer useful policy implica-
tions than comparisons between the Canadian and the U.S. transfer systems.
Meaningful comparisons require careful choice of the right countries. For
some issues, it may be useful to compare the United States and the United
Kingdom, since both have relatively unregulated private-sector labor markets.
For other issues, it may be more useful to compare Germany and the United
States, both of which have a well-developed federalist system, with strong state
governments. But here, as elsewhere in economics, there is a trade-off. Coun-
tries that are similar in many respects are unlikely to have extremely different
policies. The gain in similarity comes at the likely cost of less variation in the
independent variable of concern.
A second way to deal with country heterogeneity in cross-national compari-
sons is to focus on changes in differences over time rather than on point-in-
time differences in programs and outcomes. Looking at the changes in relative
vacancy rates between two countries when one country implements stricter
severance provisions is more convincing than comparing vacancy rates in a
country with strict severance laws to those in a country with few severance
restrictions. Fixed-effects models—difference in difference techniques—thatIntroduction
contrast changes in country A before and after a program has been introduced
with changes in country B (with no program) offer a way to control for long-
term differences between countries.
Third, meaningful interpretation of statistical results requires an understand-
ing of the institutional differences between countries. It is time consuming to
learn about the institutional structure of any particular country and to become
familiar with and gain access to its microdata sources. This means that good
cross-national analysis will often involve comparisons between only a few
countries at a time. A careful two-country analysis by a scholar who under-
stands the history and structure of both countries and who has good microdata
samples of individual behavior in each country should provide more informa-
tion than a fifteen-country comparison based on aggregate data that necessarily
ignores many of the most interesting institutional differences between the
countries involved.
The papers in this volume are explicitly designed to meet these criteria. The
authors have carefully selected countries whose comparison seems particularly
appropriate for their topic; they limit their analysis to two or three countries,
providing detailed information on the economic and institutional differences
between these countries (many authors are writing about countries they know
well); they use as many different sources of national data as are available, par-
ticularly seeking good microeconomic data; and when possible they focus on
the effects of changes in programs over time rather than on point-in-time com-
parisons.
The next eleven sections of this introduction briefly summarize the main
conclusions of each of the eleven chapters of the book. Readers interested in
the overall conclusions of the volume should skip to the final section.
Evaluating the Connection between Social Protection and Economic
Flexibility
Rebecca Blank and Richard Freeman set up the issues in this volume in
chapter 1, summarizing the cross-Atlantic debate of the past decade over the
question "Why are European unemployment rates so high?" and reviewing the
evidence for the argument that a primary culprit was the larger welfare state in
most European countries.
Blank and Freeman describe a variety of ways by which social protection
was believed to promote high European unemployment, limiting both employ-
ers' and workers' economic adjustment to macroeconomic shocks. In general,
these arguments rely on economic analysis showing that government interven-
tions can cause inefficiencies by creating incentives for market participants to
behave differently than they would in an unregulated economy. For instance,
income transfer programs may lead a worker to stay out of the labor market
longer, adding to the unemployment rate. Severance pay requirements may
make employers less likely to hire workers who will be costly to fire.Rebecca M. Blank
Those who argue for strong social protection programs typically respond in
several ways. Some admit that social programs have distortionary costs but
argue that the benefits of these programs in terms of increased well-being,
which critics rarely measure, exceed the costs. Others, skeptical about the
"trade-off" argument, often point out that most analysts of the distortionary
effects of social protection programs compare them to a situation of perfect
competition, a rarity in most modern economies. In a world with many overlap-
ping tax, regulation, and transfer programs, some social programs may offset
the inefficiencies and distortions caused by others. Finally, many proponents
of social protection programs deny the premise of a trade-off altogether, stress-
ing the role of such programs in enhancing human capital and productivity in
the labor market.
Evaluating the evidence for these arguments, Blank and Freeman conclude
that there is little empirical evidence of large trade-offs between labor market
flexibility and social protection programs in general. They argue that the best
attitude toward the trade-off hypothesis should be one of open-minded skepti-
cism and suggest a research agenda that might usefully expand our knowledge
in this area.
Trends in Social Protection Programs and Expenditures
In the second chapter, Peter Scherer looks at trends in social protection pro-
grams within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries. He uses just-released OECD data that provide consistent
country-specific estimates of public expenditures on social protection pro-
grams from 1960 through 1988. Since the early 1980s, there has been little
increase on average in the share of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on
public social protection programs within OECD countries, a sharp contrast to
the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, there appears to be relative stability in the
share of the major components of social expenditure: health care, expenditure
on elderly pensions, and expenditures on the non-aged. The United States, of
course, is an exception to this, with a growing share of health care expendi-
tures.
The stability in the OECD average hides a great deal of variance across
countries, and Scherer discusses some of the different variance patterns. The
general conclusion, however, is that social protection expenditures have not
been increasing at a rate faster than GDP in most industrialized countries over
the past decade. Scherer discusses some of the reasons common across coun-
tries for the slowdown in the growth rate of social spending.
After reviewing these data, Scherer discusses differences in how various
social protection systems deal with the issues of individual risk. Countries
whose legal history is Anglo-Saxon have different presumptions about the role
of the state versus the role of the family than do countries whose legal historyIntroduction
is based on the Napoleonic code. This creates somewhat different public ten-
sions and debates in these different countries. Scherer also discusses the ques-
tion of how social protection expenditures relate to labor force participation,
noting the inherent tensions between greater income protection and work in-
centives.
Does Employment Protection Reduce Labor Market Flexibility?
Laws that restrict firms' ability to lay off workers should slow the employ-
ment decline that occurs during a downturn and may also limit employment
growth in a boom, as firms are reluctant to hire workers who will be costly to
fire. In chapter 3, Katharine Abraham and Susan Houseman investigate the
extent to which job security regulations adversely affect labor market flexibil-
ity, particularly focusing on advance notice and severance pay requirements in
West Germany, France, and Belgium. The result should be much less cycli-
cality in employment in countries with strong job security legislation. But
Abraham and Houseman note that many of these countries also have policies
that encourage firms to utilize hours adjustments, such as short-time benefits
that provide partial wage replacement to workers whose hours have been re-
duced. If firms facing restrictions on employment adjustment make greater use
of hours adjustment, total labor adjustment over the cycle may not be lower
but may be differently distributed between employment and hours changes.
In the 1970s, to protect workers suddenly threatened by mass layoffs and
plant closings, many European countries strengthened their requirements for
advance notice and severance pay. As European unemployment problems con-
tinued, however, many countries subsequently loosened these regulations by
the late 1980s. West Germany, France, and Belgium all experienced these
changes, in sharp contrast to the United States, which had no advance-notice
or severance pay requirements throughout most of this period.
Through both graphic and econometric analysis of the data, Abraham and
Houseman investigate the speed of adjustment of employment and hours. The
results indicate that the United States has much faster employment adjustment
than does West Germany, France, or Belgium, consistent with its lower level
of employment security legislation. In contrast, hours adjust at about the same
speed in West Germany, Belgium, and the United States, indicating that hours
adjustment is a far more important component in aggregate labor adjustment
in these European countries.
To test the effect of employment security legislation on labor market adjust-
ment, Abraham and Houseman compare the speed of employment and hours
adjustments in West Germany, France, and Belgium before and after changes
in the stringency of job protection laws. If, as many European employers claim,
such regulations limit their ability to adapt flexibility to market changes, then
the loosening of these laws in the mid-1980s should have accelerated the rateRebecca M. Blank
of employment adjustment in these three economies. Strikingly, they find virtu-
ally no evidence that the rate of adjustment over time changed in any of these
countries after job security provisions were loosened.
Thus, this paper indicates that strong job security provisions may well be
compatible with labor market flexibility. But it is flexibility of a different kind
than we see in the United States, with more emphasis on hours adjustment and
less emphasis on employment adjustment. One effect of this is to spread the
costs of an economic downturn more broadly among workers. This is, of
course, also consistent with the institutional structure of the Japanese labor
market (although this paper does not look at that country), which provides
substantial job security to its workers and yet seems able to respond quite flex-
ibly to economic changes.
Is Regional Mobility Necessary for Flexible Labor Markets?
Labor mobility is often taken to be a necessary ingredient in economic flex-
ibility. In chapter 4, Edward Montgomery looks at regional labor adjustments
in the United States and Japan, investigating the persistence of regional wage
and unemployment differentials in each country and the role of interregional
migration in offsetting these differentials.
Both Japan and the United States experienced greater economic growth in
the 1980s than did Europe, although Japan's growth outpaced the United
States'. Many have suggested that Japan's greater growth is due at least in part
to policies designed to enhance labor mobility. If Japan's policies to encourage
labor mobility are more successful, this implies that interregional differences
should be less persistent and interregional migration should be higher in Japan.
Comparing equal-area migration rates, it turns out that regional migration in
Japan is less than half that in the United States.
Montgomery investigates the persistence of regional levels of employment
growth, unemployment rates, and earnings in the two countries, looking at Jap-
anese prefectures and U.S. states. Unemployment rates and rates of economic
growth show significant persistence within Japanese prefectures over time but
are not persistent over time within U.S. states. Prefectural earnings seem to
show little persistence over time, however, while higher wages do show some
persistence within states.
To further investigate these differences, Montgomery explores the determi-
nants of regional earnings and unemployment rates over time. He finds evi-
dence in both countries that regional labor markets respond to regional demand
factors. Regional migration rates in both countries are also responsive to eco-
nomic forces. Because of the size of Japanese prefectures, it is quite possible
to commute between them for work. Therefore, Montgomery investigates in-
terprefectural commuting patterns as well as migration patterns and finds that
commuting patterns are similar to migration patterns and affected in the same
way by economic forces.Introduction
The overall conclusion of this paper is that regional adjustment appears to
be somewhat slower and regional mobility lower in Japan. Both countries show
evidence of substantial responsiveness within their regional labor markets. Re-
gional wages, unemployment rates, and migration rates all vary as the eco-
nomic environment within regions changes. But migration across equivalent
regions is lower and regional employment growth and unemployment are more
persistent over time in Japan than in the United States. Thus, there is little
evidence that Japanese labor market policy creates greater regional economic
flexibility or migration. While regional labor market flexibility might have
been an important factor behind the relatively more successful U.S. and Japa-
nese economies in the 1980s, this cannot explain the higher growth and lower
unemployment experienced by Japan versus the United States over this decade.
Does Housing Market Policy Influence Labor Market Mobility?
Most governments intervene heavily in housing markets through tax laws,
building codes, rent subsidies, subsidized housing construction, and tenant
protection. To the extent that these policies tie people to particular locations,
they may limit labor market flexibility by limiting mobility. In chapter 5, Axel
Borsch-Supan compares the effects of housing policy in the United States,
West Germany, and Japan. He focuses on the impact of tenant protection regu-
lation and of homeownership subsidies across these countries.
German tenant protection laws make rent increases on sitting tenants diffi-
cult to obtain but do not regulate starting rents. Borsch-Supan investigates the
effect of these laws on tenure discounts—that is, the tendency for there to be
a growing difference over time between the rents of sitting tenants and the
rents of new tenants in equivalent housing. He finds large tenure discounts in
West Germany. Certain cities in the United States also have rent controls, and
Borsch-Supan compares these cities to those without such laws. He finds ten-
ure discounts in the United States that are as large or larger than in West Ger-
many and that are virtually the same in cities without rent control as they are
in cities with rent control. This indicates that tenure discounts are not caused
by rent control laws. To the extent that worker mobility is limited by tenant
discounts, this is not due to tenant protection legislation.
Borsch-Supan also compares mobility in West Germany before and after
tenant protection laws were introduced in 1971 and after they were weakened
in 1983 and 1987. There is no observable change in mobility rates in West
Germany consistent with the claim that these legislative changes in tenant pro-
tection affected mobility. While mobility declined in the early 1970s, when the
law was first being implemented, it declined even further in the 1980s, when
the law was substantially weakened.
Homeownership subsidies, designed to improve households' well-being by
fostering homeownership, are another major source of government interven-
tion into the housing market. All three countries offer substantial subsidies toRebecca M. Blank
homeowners through tax and loan subsidy programs. Borsch-Supan presents
evidence that these subsidies increase homeownership.
To the extent that homeownership subsidies encourage greater homeown-
ership, this may decrease labor mobility. Homeowners have much lower rates
of mobility in all three countries. Aggregate cross-national mobility rates,
however, are clearly not dominated by this effect. Homeownership rates in
Japan and the United States are at 61 percent and 64 percent respectively, while
they are only half this in Germany, at 39 percent. Yet 18 percent of U.S. house-
holds move every year, while 10 percent of Japanese households move and
only 7 percent of German households move. Thus, the country with the lowest
homeownership level also has the lowest mobility rate.
The overall conclusion of this paper is that there is little evidence that hous-
ing market regulations substantially impact national labor mobility. While
homeownership subsidies appear to increase homeownership, which is linked
with lower mobility rates, these differences do not dominate cross-national
patterns of mobility. Tenant protection laws also do not appear to impact mobil-
ity rates.
Does Tying Health Insurance to Employment Limit Job Mobility?
One of the many complaints about the U.S. health system of employer-
provided care is that it may interfere with the smooth functioning of the labor
market by creating "job lock": workers may be discouraged from changing
jobs if they fear that such a change could produce an interruption or termina-
tion of health insurance. In chapter 6, Douglas Holtz-Eakin investigates this
issue in the United States and West Germany. While Germany ensures health
care, some German workers must change insurance funds when they change
jobs, whereas others do not. Those who change funds can face a change in the
price they pay. For these German workers, this could also limit job mobility.
The raw data in the United States are consistent with the hypothesis that
those with health insurance on their job change jobs less often. Of married
workers who are insured on their job, 26 percent will change jobs in the next
three years; 37 percent of those who are uninsured will change jobs. The in-
sured are a very different group from the uninsured, however, and it may be
these differences rather than the availability of insurance that is causing differ-
ential job mobility. Holtz-Eakin investigates the possibility of job lock by look-
ing at whether those with insurance on their own job or on their spouse's job
are less likely to change jobs, controlling for all other characteristics of the
individual and the job.
His conclusions for the United States are straightforward. There is no evi-
dence of significant job lock among married or single workers, nor is there any
evidence that this effect is any different over a three-year period than over a
one-year period. Even workers in poorer health or with larger families show
no evidence that they are less likely to change jobs if they are insured.
In the West German data, Holtz-Eakin estimates that about 50 percent of theIntroduction
work force may face a change in health insurance rates if they change jobs. Job
changes in West Germany are quite infrequent compared to the United States,
consistent with the evidence in the previous chapter that indicated migration
rates in West Germany are well below those in the United States. Again, the
raw data indicate that workers in national insurance funds are somewhat more
likely to move than workers who face potential insurance price changes.
When the probability of job changes is estimated, controlling for individual
and job characteristics, West German data provide somewhat more support for
the job lock hypothesis than do U.S. data. For some groups, there is evidence
of small effects that are weakly significant. Holtz-Eakin concludes that his
evidence supports the possibility that the low rate of West German job mobility
is reduced further by the institutional structure of the German health insurance
system, but the evidence is relatively weak and the estimated effects are small.
The conclusion of this paper is that the health insurance systems of these
two countries do not appear to have major effects on labor market mobility.
This implies that these systems should not be judged by their secondary effects
on labor mobility, which are small or nonexistent, but should be judged by
their primary effects on access to health care and on the efficiency and quality
of care they provide.
Do Public Pension Plans Limit Older Workers' Labor
Market Responsiveness?
Publicly supported pension and early retirement plans exist in all industrial-
ized countries. In times of high unemployment, these policies may, by provid-
ing alternative sources of income, encourage older workers to leave the labor
market. Of course, this may mean older workers are less likely to enter the
labor market in times of high demand, as well. In chapter 7, using data from
the United States, Japan, and Sweden, Marcus Rebick investigates the effect
of public pension plans on the responsiveness of older workers' labor market
behavior.
In all three of these countries, there have been expansions in public pension
benefits, coverage, and eligibility over time. At the same time, older men have
substantially decreased their labor market participation, although older wom-
en's labor force participation has increased or (at higher ages) shown little
change. The economic well-being of older persons has unambiguously im-
proved in all three countries as the public pension system has expanded. For
instance, poverty among the elderly has decreased. To the extent these public
pensions are designed to improve the well-being of the elderly, they appear to
be successful.
Rebick investigates the responsiveness of the share of older workers who
are employed to cyclical changes in aggregate demand. The results indicate
that the share of older men who are employed decreases significantly when
unemployment rises. The response among both Japanese and Swedish men is
larger than among U.S. men, primarily because men in these two countries10 Rebecca M. Blank
have a larger propensity to drop out of the labor market when the unemploy-
ment rate rises. Among older women, the patterns are similar but not quite as
strong. Rebick concludes that both Japan and Sweden rely heavily on their
older workers to leave the labor force in economic downturns in order to main-
tain their reputation as countries with stable employment and low unem-
ployment.
To investigate the effect of changes in public retirement laws, Rebick looks
at differences in the responsiveness of older workers to economic changes dur-
ing two periods, one with lower benefits and one with higher benefits, in the
United States and Japan. If higher benefits make it more possible for older
workers to leave the labor market in times of economic downturns, then the
employment of these workers should be more responsive in the second period
than in the first. If, however, higher benefits make it harder to induce older
workers to reenter the labor market when labor demand rises, then the employ-
ment of workers should be less responsive in the second period. The results
are very mixed, with greater responsiveness among some groups and less re-
sponsiveness among others. There appears to be little consistent pattern in the
changes in labor market responsiveness to the macroeconomy among older
workers as benefits expand.
Rebick concludes that the responsiveness of older workers to aggregate eco-
nomic conditions is greater in Japan and Sweden than in the United States,
indicating that, by leaving the labor market and using public assistance, they
bear more of the burden of labor market adjustment to a recession. Although
levels of labor force participation among older workers have clearly declined
as public pensions have increased, there is little evidence that the respon-
siveness of older workers to aggregate economic demand has changed. Rebick
concludes that the primary effects of these programs are on the economic well-
being of the elderly, not on their labor market responsiveness.
Does the Size of the Public Sector Limit Labor Market Flexibility?
Expansions of social protection programs almost inevitably result in expan-
sions of the public sector, as workers are needed to implement and oversee the
operation of public programs. Exclusive of the effect of any particular welfare
state program, the public sector expansion that it induces may limit labor mar-
ket flexibility if the public sector labor market is less responsive to demand
changes. Rebecca Blank investigates this question in chapter 8, using data from
the United States and the United Kingdom, two countries whose leadership
over the 1980s launched strong attacks on public sector bureaucracy.
Worker characteristics in the public sector are relatively similar in the
United States and the United Kingdom. In both places, expansion in the public
sector will create relative employment expansion among well-educated, white-
collar, clerical and service workers, women, and minorities.11 Introduction
Both the United States and United Kingdom have positive aggregate public/
private wage differentials. Public sector workers earned 10.5 percent more
than private workers in 1987 in the United Kingdom and 3.1 percent more than
private workers in the United States in 1989. There is evidence in both coun-
tries over the 1980s that public sector wages came more into alignment with
private sector wages, although these changes varied substantially among dif-
ferent groups of workers in both countries.
Over the 1980s the distribution of wages in both the United States and the
United Kingdom has widened. In both countries, wages in the public sector
are more compressed than in the private sector, but they have widened along
with private sector wage distributions. This indicates that wage distributions in
both sectors are responding in similar ways to the economic forces causing
these distributional changes.
In addition, Blank looks at variability in employment and wages among pub-
lic and private sector workers over time. In general, she finds that, in both
countries, variation in employment and in wages is as great over time in the
public sector as in the private sector, providing little indication that the public
sector is less adaptable over time. The correlation between employment
changes and the economic cycle is lower in the public sector, however, than in
the private sector. But if public sector demands do not move cyclically, there
is no reason for public sector employment to move cyclically. The more im-
portant question is how public employment responds to the demand for pub-
lic services.
The last part of the paper estimates a series of models, relating changes in
aggregate private and public sector demand to changes in private and public
sector employment. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, in-
creases in government demand appear to have little long-run effect on public
or private sector employment. Increases in private demand, however, increase
both public and private sector employment in the United States. In the United
Kingdom, in contrast, increases in private demand increase private employ-
ment but have few effects on public employment.
Blank concludes that there is little evidence of substantial inflexibility in
public sector labor markets. In both countries, public sector labor markets have
shown substantial changes over the past decade, with wages coming closer to
private sector wages and with similar distributional changes. In both countries,
there is considerable variability in public and private sector employment and
wages over time, although the patterns of variability in the public sector are
less cyclical than those in the private sector. In the United States, both public
and private sector labor markets expand when private demand grows. The main
evidence of inflexibility occurs in the United Kingdom, where there appears
to be less spillover in demand between the growth of the public and private
sectors.12 Rebecca M. Blank
Does the Avoidance of Employment Mandates Increase Flexibility?
Most mandatory social protection legislation assumes that enforcement will
be effective. If noncompliance is possible, however, an underground economy
may emerge that allows those workers and firms who find these mandates most
costly to avoid government regulations, thereby creating greater economic
flexibility. In chapter 9, Sara de la Rica and Thomas Lemieux investigate the
employer provision of health insurance in the United States, where health in-
surance is optional, with health insurance coverage in Spain, which levies man-
datory taxes to pay for its nationalized health plan but where substantial non-
compliance occurs.
Health, disability, and pension benefits in Spain are publicly provided and
supported through a 24 percent mandatory social security tax per worker.
These high tax rates create incentives for firms to hire workers off the books,
especially since enforcement is weak and fines for noncompliance are not pu-
nitive. If workers are hired off the books, they will not receive a social security
card, which they need to gain access to the national health care system. Since
care is provided to all members of a worker's family, however, those who have
working spouses can receive insurance through their spouse.
A survey in 1985 found that 12 percent of all Spanish workers reported they
avoided social security taxes. This is in contrast to 32 percent of U.S. workers
who report that they are not covered by health insurance through their em-
ployer. The well-being implications of these two systems are very different,
however. Virtually 100 percent of uncovered Spanish workers have a working
spouse who is covered by the system, but this is not true in the United States.
For instance 13 percent of employed married women in the United States have
no health insurance coverage.
De la Rica and Lemieux estimate the probability that a worker receives
health insurance through his or her employer in the two countries. In both
countries, similar factors determine the likelihood of receiving health insur-
ance. Married males in full-time jobs with longer tenure, higher wages, and
more education are most likely to get health insurance. Even after controlling
for a substantial number of personal and job characteristics, however, there are
big differences across industries in the propensity to provide health insurance
to workers. The industries with higher tax avoidance in Spain are also less
likely to provide health insurance in the United States.
De la Rica and Lemieux conclude that the provision of health insurance by
both U.S. and Spanish firms is affected by labor demand and supply factors
and that these factors are quite similar across the two countries. Thus, although
the institutional systems governing health care are different, similar groups of
workers remain uncovered. The possibility of noncompliance in Spain pro-
duces a market outcome relatively similar to the outcome in the United States.
The primary difference in the systems is one of well-being; in the United States
a substantial number of workers remain without access to health insurance.13 Introduction
While it would be wrong to conclude that a good policy is to pass mandatory
laws and then be relatively lax about enforcing compliance, this paper does
indicate that attention to compliance and underground economy questions are
very important if the actual adaptability of the labor market is to be understood.
Do Limits on Income Assistance Payments Move Women into
the Labor Market?
In the United States in particular, there has been an ongoing debate about
the extent to which income transfer programs for low-income single mothers
keep women out of the labor market. In chapter 10, Maria Hanratty compares
U.S. income support programs for single mothers, which provide similar levels
of support for a family until a child reaches age eighteen, with French income
support programs, which are sharply curtailed after the youngest child in a
family reaches age three.
Single parents in France receive assistance from a variety of programs with
much higher total benefits than public support programs would provide to simi-
lar women in the United States. After the youngest child reaches age three,
however, French mothers' benefits become less generous than those in the
United States. In addition, public nursery school is available in France, sub-
stantially decreasing the cost of child care for mothers. Virtually 100 percent
of children age three and over attend public nursery school, which is viewed
not as child care but as the beginning of public education.
Hanratty compares the employment rates of single mothers with preschool-
ers over age 3 to those with preschoolers under age 3, in France and in the
United States. She estimates the effect of decreased public transfers on labor
supply through several methods. Even after controlling for the availability of
public child care in France and the propensity for mothers to work more in
general as their children age, she finds a significant net increase in employment
among single women as a result of this program structure.
Hanratty tests this result further by looking at the effects of a similar change
in income support for married mothers with three or more children who quit
work for the birth of a child. These mothers receive a special allowance until
their youngest child turns three or until they reenter the labor force, whichever
occurs first. Using similar analysis, Hanratty demonstrates that these mothers
also increase their labor force participation, but by a much smaller amount,
when their income support is terminated.
The results of this paper indicate that single French mothers with preschool
children increase their labor force participation when their public assistance
income is cut back. The implication is that putting time limits on welfare pro-
grams in France seems to increase women's labor market involvement. It is
important to recognize, however, that the magnitude of this effect may be de-
pendent upon the network of social programs available in France for working
single parents.14 Rebecca M. Blank
The effect of this policy on long-term labor market flexibility and family
well-being is hard to predict. On the one hand, women are obtaining more
labor market experience with this program, which should increase their wage
and employment opportunities and thus increase the skill level and size of the
labor force. On the other hand, the children may be receiving somewhat less
parental attention, and any long-run effect of this is difficult to measure.
What Difference Do Childcare and Maternal Leave Policies Make?
Compared to the United States, many European countries have far more
extensive maternity leave policies and more publicly available child care. The
effect of these programs on labor market flexibility may be twofold. First, they
may affect women's long-run productivity if they change women's level of labor
market experience. Maternity leave programs may decrease experience, but
childcare programs may increase labor market contact. Second, such programs
may affect long-term productivity in an economy if they enhance the cognitive
development of young children. The net effect of such programs on overall
labor market flexibility is clearly uncertain. In chapter 11, Siv Gustafsson and
Frank Stafford investigate the labor market effects of childcare policies in the
United States, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
The United States provides little public support for women who have chil-
dren, except among those with very low incomes. It has no paid maternity
leave and little publicly funded care. In contrast, Sweden provides universally
available and quite generous maternity leave and public day care. The Nether-
lands' childcare policy is similar to the U.S. policy, with little public day care
or leave, but it emerged from a very different history in which opposing reli-
gious groups tried to foster fertility among their members by encouraging
women to stay at home.
Gustafsson and Stafford indicate that these policy differences lead to sub-
stantial differences in family behavior. In the United States, there is high labor
force participation by women, and mothers return to work almost immediately
after a child is born. Sweden has high labor force participation rates among
mothers of older preschoolers, but there is very low labor force participation
among mothers with children under age one. The Netherlands has relatively
low labor force participation rates among all young mothers, and work behav-
ior is strongly affected by religious affiliation. While 72 to 82 percent of young
married women work in the United States and in Sweden, only 49 percent of
these women work in the Netherlands.
Estimates of the determinants of wages for younger women in these three
countries indicate that the returns to education and experience, while positive
in all countries, are much larger in the United States. While these returns
are partly determined by the childcare policies in the United States that encour-
age women to work more, they in turn reinforce the U.S. system by giving
larger returns to those women who return to work quickly and remain in the
labor market more constantly over their lifetime.15 Introduction
The conclusions of this paper are twofold. First, long-term institutional
forces within countries shape their childcare policy. These forces have resulted
in very different institutional structures across countries and continue to shape
women's behavior. Second, once these structures are created, they in turn re-
inforce behavior, so that the labor market participation patterns and wage pat-
terns of U.S. and Swedish women are very different in ways determined by the
vast differences in policy between the two countries.
Pulling It All Together: What Does This Volume Say?
Several main conclusions emerge from the empirical papers in this volume.
Most important, these papers give little evidence that labor market flexibility
is substantially affected by the presence of social protection programs, nor is
there evidence that the speed of labor market adjustment can be enhanced by
limiting these programs. Abraham and Houseman find little effect on labor
adjustment in West Germany, France, or Belgium when advance notice and
severance pay requirements are loosened. Montgomery finds that Japan has
less interregional mobility and greater persistence of regional differentials than
the United States, even though it (Japan) had greater economic growth over
the past several decades. Borsch-Supan finds little evidence that differences in
housing market regulations between West Germany, Japan, and the United
States strongly affect country-specific mobility rates. Holtz-Eakin finds no evi-
dence that tying health insurance to jobs in the United States prevents job mo-
bility, and only weak evidence of such an effect in West Germany. Rebick finds
little evidence that increases in pension benefits in Japan, Sweden, and the
United States substantially changed the responsiveness of older workers to
changes in labor market demands. Blank finds little evidence that public sector
labor markets in the United States and the United Kingdom have been much
less responsive to the overall economy over the past decade than the private
sector has. De la Rica and Lemieux find that mandated fringe benefit taxes in
Spain have had less impact on the labor market than might be predicted, be-
cause extensive noncompliance has occurred. Finally, both Hanratty and Gus-
tafsson and Stafford find evidence that child-related policies definitely affect
the labor market behavior of mothers of young children, but these authors are
unable to conclude whether this substantially affects the flexibility of the la-
bor market.
The consistency of this conclusion is particularly striking in this volume
because it occurs across papers that use very different data sets to investigate
the effects of different programs in different countries. When the authors of
this volume came together to present their research to one another, all of us
were struck by the correspondence in results and inferences across these
papers.
This conclusion is consistent with other research that questions the hypothe-
sis that social protection laws are the primary cause of economic inflexibility.
Labour and Society (1987) devoted an entire issue to articles reviewing this16 Rebecca M. Blank
hypothesis skeptically. Burtless (1987) indicates that the more-extensive unem-
ployment benefits in European countries did not cause the relative rise in Euro-
pean versus U.S. unemployment rates over the 1970s and 1980s, because the
estimated effects are far too small to generate the large observed unemploy-
ment changes. Blanchflower and Freeman (1993) find that even the most lib-
eral estimates of the effects of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's programs
on labor market flexibility were dwarfed by the effects of aggregate economic
conditions. Buechtemann (1993) argues that mechanisms to limit labor market
adjustment and protect workers arise because of failures in the labor market
and that these "inflexibilities" would exist even in the absence of strong em-
ployment protection laws.
Rather than finding that more-extensive social protection systems seem to
limit labor market adjustment, a second conclusion of this volume is that coun-
tries with more extensive social protection systems find other ways by which
adjustment can occur. In other words, the entire system of interlocking pro-
grams and behavior in different countries is quite different. In comparison to
the United States, Germany and Belgium rely more heavily on hours adjust-
ment rather than employment adjustment when faced with an economic down-
turn. Even though Japan has less interregional mobility than the United States,
it has high rates of interregional commuting. Sweden and Japan rely more
heavily than does the United States on older workers leaving the labor market
in an economic downturn to keep unemployment rates low. Young Swedish
women have labor force participation rates very similar to young American
women's, but a much higher fraction of the Swedish women take more than a
year off work when they have a child.
Two important implications follow from the fact that there are many routes
to economic adjustment. On the one hand, this means that simple measures of
economic flexibility may say little about the overall economic adaptability of
an economy. The speed of employment adjustment alone is not a good measure
of labor market adjustment, without corresponding information on wage and
hours adjustment. Mobility rates alone can vary for many reasons and are not
a good measure of labor market flexibility. Information on the amount of move-
ment between employment and unemployment is of limited usefulness without
matching information on how many people are leaving the labor market en-
tirely.
On the other hand, comparing single programs across countries can produce
misleading inferences. It is important to understand how individual programs
link into the web of rules and institutions in each country. High and mandatory
per-employee taxes to pay for public health and pensions plans in Spain do not
produce major disemployment of low-skilled workers, because of the preva-
lence of tax avoidance. Time-limited income support payments to single young
mothers in France have strong labor market effects partly because free public
child care is available just at the point when transfer payments drop. Higher
homeownership subsidies in the United States than in Germany do not produce17 Introduction
lower mobility rates in the United States, as many other factors influence mo-
bility.
Finally, the third main conclusion of this volume is that it is hard to conclude
anything about the net effect of social protection programs simply by observ-
ing that they cause behavioral changes. Virtually all of these papers confirm
the classic economist's wisdom that the structure of government programs can
affect the behavior of employers and workers. Germany, France, and Belgium
do less employment adjustment in the face of significant restrictions on major
layoffs. Homeownership subsidies in Germany, Japan, and the United States
significantly affect homeownership rates in those countries. Rising public re-
tirement benefits have produced a downward trend in the labor market partici-
pation of older men over time. Cutting off income transfers to young mothers
increases their propensity to spend more time in the labor market. There is
nothing in these papers that denies the standard conclusions about the poten-
tially distortionary effects of government programs on behavior.
Yet, among the papers in this volume that study specific social protection
programs, virtually all of them also point to changes in worker well-being pro-
vided by these programs. Higher public retirement benefits have increased the
economic well-being of the elderly. The Spanish health insurance system pro-
vides health insurance to virtually 100 percent of Spanish workers, while the
U.S. system leaves many uninsured. Extensive maternity leave programs in
Sweden allow mothers to stay home with young children.
These papers were not written with the intention of trying to measure the
aggregate costs and benefits of social protection programs; thus, they do not
produce any answer to the question of whether the net costs and benefits of
such programs are positive or negative. But they do serve as a reminder that
these programs often have substantial positive social benefits associated with
them, benefits too rarely discussed in the economics literature. The research
agenda laid out by Blank and Freeman to look more carefully at these ques-
tions indicates some ways to begin more fully analyzing the effects of social
protection programs.
There are some important caveats to these conclusions. First, the research in
all of these papers focuses on particular programs in particular countries at
particular points in time. The results in this volume indicate that the changes
in social protection programs enacted by European countries in the 1980s in
order to increase labor market flexibility had few effects. It is possible that
programmatic changes in other countries at other time periods might have pro-
duced different effects.
Second, it could be claimed that many of the program changes studied in
these papers are relatively small. Rather than the implementation or abolish-
ment of programs, most of the changes studied here involve the expansion or
contraction of existing programs. This sort of marginal change may be too
minor to have big effects on aggregate labor market flexibility. Perhaps only
major economic restructuring in European economies, involving the complete18 Rebecca M. Blank
abolishment of collective bargaining systems or radical changes in the nature
of the welfare state, will produce noticeable increases in the speed of labor
market adjustment. The research here cannot reject such a hypothesis, but it is
worth noting that such radical changes are rarely possible within stable politi-
cal environments. The program changes studied here represent ones that are
conceivable in the short run in most countries.
Third, all cross-national research is subject to the caution that there may be
missing variables that are not adequately controlled for or considered in the
analysis. The methodology in many of these papers, looking at changes in be-
havior before and after regime changes, will control for many of the fixed dif-
ferences between countries and groups. Future availability of better data and
new methodologies may make possible more effective comparisons than are
presented here, and this may in turn lead to new and different conclusions.
If we accept the conclusion of this volume, it is perhaps worthwhile to spec-
ulate why analysts were wrong when they argued in the mid-1980s that sub-
stantial cutbacks in social protection programs would solve European unem-
ployment problems. One possible reason is that the interlocking systems of
legislation and labor market operation in the European economies, while dif-
ferent from those in the United States or Japan, nonetheless had their own
internal consistency. Workers and employers were used to these systems and
had adopted modes of behavior that minimized any distortionary effects (such
as the tacit acceptance of limited employer tax avoidance in Italy or the more
extensive use of hours adjustment in West Germany.) Given that this system
was working, there was little incentive for employers or workers to substan-
tially change their behavior even after legislative changes in some of these
programs. This is the argument made by Abraham and Houseman in ex-
plaining the lack of response to loosening of job security regulations in West
Germany, France, and Belgium, and it may well be applicable to other changes
as well.
A second possible explanation is that the analysis of social protection pro-
grams as a primary cause of inflexibility and high unemployment in Europe
was simply flawed from the beginning. The best counterexample here is Japan,
a country with extensive job-security provisions and with less interregional
mobility than the United States that has consistently outperformed the United
States as well as its European competitors. Japan at least provides evidence
that there is no inherent correlation between poor economic performance and
the presence of welfare state programs and/or slower labor market adjustment
in terms of employment or mobility. It is possible that the sluggish economies
of Europe over the 1980s were due to quite different factors, such as a lack of
useful cooperation and communication between the political system and the
private sector or the increasing social alienation of growing groups of work-
ers—particularly youth—from mainstream jobs.
Results in this volume and elsewhere also suggest that perhaps the entire
focus of the past decade's discussion about "What did the United States do
right with regard to labor market policy?" has been misconceived. As Blank19 Introduction
and Freeman note, the growth of GDP per employee—one measure of produc-
tivity growth—has been as low in the United States as in Europe, while it has
been substantially higher in Japan. Only the United States' success at employ-
ment creation over the past decade has made it appear more successful in the
labor market. Viewed in terms of productivity measures, Japan is the outstand-
ing country and the United States performs as poorly as most European econ-
omies.
It is true that the U.S. economy created far more jobs than the European
economies in the past decade and therefore unemployment fell to much lower
levels. The full reasons behind this "job miracle" in the United States are not
fully understood, although it may well be at least partially due to the lower
level of employment regulation and taxation in the United States. But the
United States has also seen real wage declines among less-skilled workers and
a much larger increase in wage inequality than any other nation over the past
decade (Freeman and Katz 1994). In 1993, after several years of stagnant em-
ployment growth and growing concern about the problems of low-wage U.S.
workers, it is increasingly unclear that the labor market of the United States
over the 1980s should be either envied or emulated.
The evidence in this volume indicates that the differences in labor markets
in the United States and in other economies over the 1980s cannot be simply
ascribed to the United States' relatively lower level of social protection pro-
grams, which allowed the U.S. economy to adjust more rapidly to economic
change. While there is evidence of higher worker mobility in U.S. labor mar-
kets and faster employment adjustment than in other countries, these factors
are not easily correlated with the presence or absence of social protection pro-
grams in these countries, nor can greater flexibility—as measured by a variety
of "speed of adjustment" measures—be seen as a necessary or sufficient con-
dition for an adaptable and responsive labor market.
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